Chapter 7: Endnotes

1 Unless otherwise noted, information contained in this chapter is based on original manuscript prepared by the 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth US Army, Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan, 1945-48(R).

2 This factor was carefully evaluated by G-2 in the surrender negotiations in Manila, when the personal treatment of the Japanese emissaries, civil and military, and the phraseology of documents were handled with extraordinary attention to psychological effect against a background of Japanese cultural traditions.

3 Although Military Government had been planned and organized prior to the end of the war, it was not in effective operation during 1945 and the best part of 1946. Only one-third of GHQ was in Tokyo during the critical early phases of the Occupation (September 1945-March 1946). Troops and staffs were concerned with establishing their garrisons and military areas. Neither the Civil Sections, SCAP, nor their executive offshoots, were in a position to exercise "military government"; policies and detailed instructions were in continuous process of realistic formulation. The principal priority objective during this period was the disarmament and demobilization of the armed forces of Imperial Japan. Plans and policies for this delicate and risky undertaking were made by GHQ, Tokyo, in a coordinated effort that involved the General Staff sections primarily ; the demobilization ports and camps were run by the Japanese.

4 The Civil Sections, SCAP, particularly the Natural Resources Section and the Economic and Scientific Section became the great policy-making agencies of the Occupation, employing specialists in every field from the United States to set into motion great reform movements for every major subdivision of the Japanese Government and the economy of Japan.

5 All contacts between SCAP sections and Japanese governmental organs were made through the Central Liaison Committee composed of Japanese officials appointed by the Prime Minister, and American officers, assigned by GHQ, SCAP. This Committee maintained a liaison group in GHQ, under operational control of G-2.

6 GHQ USAFPAC PRO Release No. 227, 23 Sep 45, sub: US Initial Post Surr Policy for Japan.

7 They were: Government Section (GS); Economic and Scientific Section (ESS); Natural Resources Section (NRS); Public Health and Welfare Section (PH&W); Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), including Public Safety Division (PSD) which supervised the Japanese Police, Fire Department, Maritime and Customs Police Services; Legal Section (LS); and Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E).

8 For the first four months of Occupation Sixth Army was in control of the southern half of Honshu and the islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, with headquarters in Kyoto.

9 Gen Eichelberger, who brilliantly led Eighth Army during three years of active service in the Pacific and served with equal distinction the Allied cause during the first three years of Occupation, returned to the ZI on 4 August 1948 for retirement.

10 The initial concept of "military government" was apparently heavily influenced by its known application in Italy and Germany. This concept was inapplicable in the Philippines, a sovereign, associated country, and basically unsound for Japan since a legitimate, amenable government was in operative existence, and it was decided a priori to maintain the Japanese Government and operate through it.

11 This must be considered an ineffective change of phraseology. Psychologically, the term "military government" was bound to undercut the position of Japanese functionaries, who had to carry a substantial load. Four years later, on 1 July 1949, SCAP changed the designation of Military Government to Civil Affairs Section; this change was accompanied by a thorough cut in personnel strengths which eliminated the prefectural teams.

12 HQ Eighth US Army, 10th Info and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48(R), p. 4.

13 The former consisted of 13 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 26 enlisted men, the latter of 12 officers and 6 enlisted men.

15 At the end of the war, Japan was administratively divided into nine regions and further sub-divided into 42 prefectures, one territorial administration (for Hokkaido), and three city or municipal prefectures. Several purely administrative changes subsequently took place, and by 1948 all these major subdivisions were considered as prefectures. For purposes of MG administration, two of the nine regions (Tokai and Hokuriku) were combined, and Hokkaido was considered as a district. (One unit combined functions of both district headquarters and prefectural team.)

16 HQ Eighth US Army, 10th Info and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48 (R), p. 5.

17 This was an essential point. The prefecture is an executive and functional unit in the Japanese Government as well as an administrative or liaison unit. It was placed under the general purview of Military Government, hence affiliation with the prefecture was essential. As a matter of fact, the MG teams or units progressively conformed to and became accustomed to working in the provincial boundaries of the prefecture.

18 With the change of organization and the attending economy of personnel, the field strength dropped from 2,800 to 2,288. With the Army undergoing its readjustment program, it had become increasingly difficult to secure military personnel with which to fill positions in the numerous specialized fields, and early in the year Eighth Army had been authorized to employ civil service personnel in a wide variety of positions. (HQ Eighth US Army, 10th Info and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48 [R], p. 6.) Some civilians, trained and experienced in such specialized fields as economics, sociology, and government, were procured. Despite all efforts to adjust the MG organization to meet the needs of the Occupation with available personnel, shortages continued. In August 1948, there were 396 civilians against an authorized 529, and the military strength had dropped to 1,772 against an authorized strength of 1,911. (HQ Eighth US Army, 10th Info and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48 [R], p. 7.)

19 In each corps, one of the regional teams served as the corps headquarters, MG staff section.

20 After June 1947, one officer and two enlisted men were assigned to each MG team operating in the BCOF area: 76th MG Co (Hiroshima, Yamaguchi and Shimane Prefectures); 91st MG Co (Kagawa and Ehime Prefectures), 81st MG Co (Kochi and Tokushima Prefectures), 36th MG Co (Okayama and Tottori Prefectures). These personnel were under the supervision of the team commander and assigned to tasks in the same manner as US Army personnel. The operation of these groups as part of the US teams was most successful.

21 The strength of the section in August 1948, was 52 officers, 57 enlisted men, and 73 Department of the Army civilians. Approximately 70 foreign nationals and Japanese were employed as clerks, typists and interpreters, and for allied duties. In August 1948 the teams varied in strength from 6 officers and 19 to 26 enlisted men in the minor prefectural teams to 12 officers and 71 enlisted men in the largest of the teams. (HQ Eighth US Army, 10th Info and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48 [R], p. 8.)

22 The functioning of the typical MG teams is shown on Plate No. 67.

23 SCAP had other means of keeping informed. The Counter Intelligence Service maintained field stations in every prefecture, paralleling MG field stations but concentrating on ultra-nationalist movements, subversion, sabotage, espionage, operations of Japanese or foreign agents, social unrest and agitation, the development of Communism, etc. Public opinion was thoroughly covered in the "Daily Press Translations" of ATIS, embracing metropolitan as well as provincial newspapers.

24 It should be noted here that the practical control of newspapers, motion pictures, theaters, etc., was exercised by the Civil Censorship Division (CCD), an operating agency of the Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP; CCD maintained stations in the field, especially in communications centers. See Ch. VIII.

25 As a quasi-religious ideology, the "State Shinto" had been used by militarists and ultra-nationalists in Japan to foster, through school and home education, a military spirit among the people to support a war of expansion.

26 (1) SCAPIN 178, 22 Oct 45, sub: Administration of the Educational System of Japan. (2) SCAPIN 212, 30 Oct 45, sub: Investigation, Screening, and Certification of Teachers and Educational Officials. (3) SCAPIN 448 , 15 Dec 45, sub: Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto). It should be noted that all details of the educational reform movements were planned and directed by Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), one of the many SCAP sections created to initiate governmental reforms; MG became one of several agencies of execution.

27 HQ Eighth Army, 10th Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48 (R), p. 14.

28 SCAPIN 519, 31 Dec 45, sub: Suspension of Courses in Morals (Sbushin), Japanese History and Geography.

29 A group of distinguished American educators visited Japan to make a study of the education system. They advised SCAP and the Japanese Minister of Education on technical matters. (SCAPIN 571, 9 Jan 46, sub: Committee of Japanese Educators.)

30 Civil Censorship, in prefectural field stations, operated an efficient surveillance system in all public information fields to enforce a standard Press and Publications Code.

31 Policy responsibility: CI&E Section, one of the major operative civil sections of SCAP.

32 Policy responsibility and field supervision by joint action of CCD and CI&E.

33 In the early part of the Occupation, the policy-making civil sections were largely situated in Tokyo, as staff agencies of SCAP; field operations, surveillance, and enforcement devolved on agencies in the field; in this category only three had practical effect: MG, CCD and CID.

34 Some of the means used to advertise the health program were hygiene courses, physical examinations, demonstrations and exhibits, radio programs, newspapers, magazines, slides, film strips, charts, posters, street shows and health clubs.

35 One of the main objects in creating the Tonari Gumi in pre-surrender Japan was to facilitate police supervision over the thoughts and loyaly of the people by encouraging inter-community spying on the same pattern as was used by the Nazi Gestapo. This is still a favorite method of the special police branch of the people's Commissariat of Interior (NKVD) in the USSR.

36 Under the emergency relief program, unlawful relief claims were prevalent. Public welfare officials expected to reveal 100,000 "ghosts" on the Tokyo relief rolls alone through a census recheck. It was known that many families were drawing rations for deceased relatives, that the names on many ration cards were fictitious, and that rations were being drawn for persons, particularly Koreans and Chinese, who had left the country early in the repatriation program.

In Hyogo Prefecture, CCD intercepts indicated the existence of a sizeable "ghost" population on the critical foods ration lists. Acting on these leads, the ration records were examined on an exhaustive scale and in this one prefecture alone it was discovered that during a three months' period 2,571,028 days' rations had been drawn by "ghosts". In the course of this investigation, 33,000 bushels of food, principally rice, were confiscated, 17,336 "ghosts" laid to rest and 611 cases prepared for prosecution. As a result of the startling developments in this incident practically every prefecture in Japan undertook similar investigations, the result of which contributed immeasurably to the equitable disposition of critical foods, thereby lessening the amount of food required to be imported from America and elsewhere. (Memo, CCD for G-2 GHQ FEC, 14 Jun 49, sub: Mo Rpt of Activ)

37 HQ Eighth Army, 10th Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan 1945-48 (R), p. 26.

38 Policy direction and major economic rehabilitation measures were under the Economic & Scientific Section, one of the major operative civil sections, SCAP; the able chief of this section was one of MacArthur's pre-war staff officers in the Philippine period, Maj Gen W. E. Marquat.

39 G-2 GHQ FEC had in its possession definite proof that Communist agitation was largely responsible for this condition. See GHQ SCAP, Int Ser, Vol. IX, Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, GHQ, SCAP (S).

40 The production for 1946 was approximately 22,000,000 tons. The production quota for 1947 was set at 30,000,000. Actual production, however, did not exceed 27,500,000 tons, 90.6 percent of the last established quota. ESS, SCAP, established a production quota of 36,000,000 tons for 1948 (the minimum necessary for Japanese economic independence. Actual production was 34,791,300 tons, 96.6 percent of the quota.

41 This program was so successful that rock drills became an item of export in 1948.

42 Policy direction and major economic movements were directly handled by ESS, SCAP. Technical Intelligence, a wartime operating agency of G-2, assisted in the field inspection of laboratories, factories and raw materials.

43 A committee, appointed in 1946 by the President to investigate Japan's ability to make reparations, suggested that all industrial rehabilitation should be subordinated to reparations and that the finest Japanese industrial equipment should be reserved for dismantling and removal. These recommendations adversely influenced the economic recovery, and it was not until more favorable recommendations were made by later committees that Japanese manufacturers gained confidence and production took a more positive upswing.

44 SCAPIN 1355, 22 Nov 46, sub: Permits for Conversion and Reconversion of Industrial Plants (ESS).

45 Although initially separate, the Legal Division and the Public Safety Division were consolidated in January 1946 under the title "Legal and Public Safety Division." Three months later it was redesignated as the "Legal and Government Division". In July 1948 the Local Government Division of the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, was transferred to the Legal and Government Division, Military Government Section, Eighth Army.

The Government Section, SCAP, was one of the major policy-making civil sections of SCAP. Its chief, Brig Gen Courtney Whitney, was one of the small staff group which had been serving under General MacArthur for many years.

46 The interlocking, interdependent character of the Occupation control must be constantly kept in mind; the line of demarcation between SCAP and Eighth Army MG agencies was not rigid. Several SCAP agencies maintained field stations throughout Japan, covering each prefecture. Public safety, as a form of police control, fell into the purview of the PSD, SCAP, an operating agency of G-2, charged with the organization of police reform on the American pattern.

47 Policy direction was under the Legal Section, SCAP. Prison surveillance and reform, on the policy level, was part of the mission of PSD or CIS.

48 Prison reform and the corollary functions of inspection, were charged to the Public Safety Division, an operating agency of G-2, which employed American experts in its police and prison reform program.

49 SCAPIN 93, 4 Oct 45, sub: Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties. Several SCAP Sections were heavily involved: the MG Section and CIS checked the wartime, ultra-nationalistic records of many individuals. Immediately on landing, G-2 secured invaluable police and administrative personnel records.

50 The full account of CIS activities may be found in GHQ SCAP, Int Ser, Vol. IX, Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, GHQ, SCAP (S). The Public Safety Division (PSD), a branch of CIS, was responsible for organization and surveillance of activities of Japanese police, prisons, jails, fire departments and other institutions concerning public safety. CIS was under the control of G-2, GHQ, SCAP, and was primarily a security surveillance unit.

51 A SCAP civil section, as usual, controlled this particular field, utilizing field agencies for local implication; fiscal and banking controls, including assets and alien properties, were handled by ESS and the Civil Property Custodian.

52 All Occupation agencies were engaged in this search; the counterintelligence, including field agencies, were enormously productive: between 30/40,000 carats of diamonds were recovered, war loot from South East Asia.

53 Zaibatsu, big financial trusts, six of which (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo, Kawasaki, Fuji), together with their affiliates and subsidiaries, controlled practically all financial, commercial, and industrial life of pre-surrender Japan.

54 HQ Eighth Army, 10th Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan (R), p. 45.

55 Ibid, p. 46.

56 Personnel operating the US vaults in Tokyo Bank of Japan were assigned to the MG Section, HQ Eighth Army, and those at the Osaka Mint to the Kinki MG regional team. The operating staffs were attached for administration to the Tokyo MG team and the Osaka MG team, respectively. The accounting system used in the depositories was prescribed by SCAR

57 SCAPIN 5358-A, 6 Mar 48, sub: Disposal of Certain German Property.

58 HQ Eighth Army, 10th Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945-48 (R), p. 50.

59 Prior to July 1947 all procurement requests were audited on an account basis of relative values, which were stated in units rather than in dollars or yen. The total number of unit values expended were converted into dollar equivalents by use of a predetermined conversion factor.